Official Whistleblower Report to CIA & DNI: Blacklisting of Former Officer for Reporting Child Porn

CAVEAT: Mark Napier who is the Plaintiff in this report noted below is currently running for Congress as an Independent Candidate for Florida District 23.

The incident posted below was filed originally in 2009, but not to level of detail as outlined in this report [for the fifth time] in Jaunuary 2021. Using supporting emails, notes and unclassified documentation held in posession of Plaintiff, since 2005, Napier reconstructed events as it is outlined spanning a period of four years that followed. Efforts to contest the CIA's wrongful termination [without "Due Process"] was not just repeatedly ignored, but met with silence in 2009, 2010, 2012, 2015 and in 2021.

The Director of National Intelligence Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community has been the only entity to respond thanking the Plaintiff for bringing the situation to their attention, but no action was being taken, since the CIA did not open an investigation into the matter, in contrast to the DNI's No FEAR Act policy. Efforts to communicate with the CIA's Office of Inspector General and Office of Public Affairs to approve and disclose press releases, in addition to this report has again been met with complete silence. Plaintiff believes NO FEDERAL COURT would disagree with the fact that Plaintiff has gone above and beyond to seek a resolution to include Agency guidance on public disclosures.

Plaintiff points out in an article posted that CIA associates (all but one) have never been prosecuted for such crimes involving Child Pornography, per December 2021 article: "After Years of Silence, CIA Officers Are Exposed for Child Sexual Abuse." None of the FOIA cases reportedly disclosed by the CIA included Plaintiff's reported incident from August 2005, suggesting the CIA is not in full compliance to honoring the ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, but flat out dismissed the orders of a Federal sitting judge directing all of the CIA reports to be released. Acts of retaliation by senior CIA executives are considered to be the cultural norms. In 2015, former CIA Director John Brennan took steps to put an end to succh practices which are reflected in a number of open source press releases for the last two decades:

1) https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-cia-workplace-20140317-story.html

2) https://bullyinworkplace.com/2014/06/17/cia-cracks-down-on-bullying-harassment/

3) https://www.justsecurity.org/73641/cia-is-losing-its-best-and-brightest-and-not-just-because-of-trump/

4) https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-xpm-2013-jul-29-la-na-cia-management-20130730-story.html

Efforts to reach out to the Senate and House Oversight Committees on Intelligence, 80 plus members of Congress (to include plaintiff's own representatives in Flrodia: Senator Marco Rubio and Congressman Ted Deutch), The White House and Office of Special Counsel to seek assistance under the Wartime Suspension of Limitiations Act, No FEAR Act and Whistleblowers' Protection Act were also met with silence. Footnotes referenced in the report contained Sources and Methods involved and were classified to the Top Secret code word environment and could not be publicly disclosed for security reasons.

After the Plaintiff's last ditch efforts to seek to clear his name and restore his Honor were repeatedly ignored; did the Plaintiff [Mark Napier] decide to pursue the Congressional seat for Florida District 23 on behalf of the 'Discarded and Forgotten' who absolutely do not have a voice in Congress.

3 January 2021

Office of the Director of National Intelligence

Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community

Investigations Division, Reston 3

Washington, D.C. 20511

Mark N. Napier

1007 North Federal Highway

No. 26

Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304

Subject: Report--Complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (as amended) in relation to and under the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act and Office of the Director of National Intelligence No FEAR Act of 2002: Retaliation and Blacklisting for Reporting Child Pornography

To Whom it may concern:

My name is Mark Napier, former CIA Employee No. XXXXXXX. I was employed at the CIA from 1989 through 2005, for 16 years. Independent Contractor for CIA May 2005-May 2009, for 4 years. I wish to file a complaint under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (as amended) in relation to and under the Wartime Suspension of Limitations Act when our country is at war covering fraudulent conduct that is covered as far back as 16 October 2002 (Iraq War Resolution) and Office of the Director of National Intelligence No FEAR Act of 2002. I would like to seek U.S. Congressional investigative oversight assistance who reside over National Intelligence, Judicial, and Civil Rights and Liberties in bringing to light an egregious act of retaliation in 2009, by a senior Central Intelligence Agency official.

The incidents occurred between the periods in 2005, in Iraq and 2005-2009 in Afghanistan. The impact of this retaliation has transcended since. A search of CIA historic databases will yield some, but not all positive results in favor of my case. Additional classified information (sources and methods) may be addressed in a secure environment where I indicate symbolically using “**(#)”. Where I symbolically use “*(#)” indicates private information or insight. I will only disclose an “IDEN” (identity) list associated with names for security precaution, though some have been fully disclosed in open source. Nonetheless, I do not want to give the CIA an excuse to continue its retribution, but I will disclose information to Congressional oversight.

Summary: In short, in 2009, as part of a personal vendetta I was retaliated against for two events that occurred 4 years earlier that embarrassed a senior CIA official (IDEN-A:) twice in a 3-month period--8 June through 29 August 2005. IDEN-A: was first caught politicizing a report back to CIA that no doubt would find its way to Congress on how the CIA was supporting the military in Iraq. Second, and most important, because I defended a staff employee--in official traffic back to CIA Headquarters as a Whistleblower--that CIA Station in Iraq had made a grave injustice to have kicked the staff employee out of Iraq for reporting the downloading of Child Pornography on two x CIA Top Secret computers in 2005. IDEN-A: pursued opportunities to retaliate even 4 years later when he caught up with me in Afghanistan. It was not by happenstance that my last 2 ½ years of successful operations along the Afghan/Pak border**(1)--preventing and disrupting terrorists’ threats against military personnel, in addition to saving the lives of our soldiers--were abruptly discredited and sabotaged.

IDEN-A: who was appointed COS of Afghanistan in 2008, selfishly without regards to the wellbeing of U.S. soldiers that my operations helped to protect, decided to undermine my efforts**(2) the last two months of my tour through January 2009, to pursue his own personal vendetta; as if he was picking up where he left off in Iraq, 4 years earlier in 2005. In early to mid-2009, IDEN-A: approached my home office in Counterterrorism Center (CTC) and maliciously reiterated his fabricated, slanderous accusation behind closed doors that I had tried to overcharge the Agency $14,000 in Iraq, 4 years earlier. IDEN-A: apparently failed to disclose the embarrassing Child Pornography incident. Ironically, I was never questioned, charged, investigated, nor prosecutedfor this alleged felony crime; if I had been guilty, by the Agency’s Office of Security (OS) in the 4 years that followed, or since. Nonetheless, my home office of Counterterrorism Center greased the skids for Blacklisting me without notice, without a hearing, nor afforded Due Process or arbitration based on a senior CIA official’s word, despite electronic evidence in my favor. It was not my cunningness that made me homeless on the streets for the 5 years that followed losing everything; it was doing the right thing of reporting Child Pornography and standing up to defend a CIA staff employee who had been wronged and demoralized as a grandfather. The employee found the material not just morally wrong and offensive, but the incident violated Agency policy on connecting a Top Secret computer to open source internet. His only fault was bypassing Station. My only fault was reporting the truth as directed to do so. Station mismanagement of the incident was another matter.

Introduction:

IDEN-A: for his career would receive before retiring The Donovan Award, Intelligence Star, George H. Bush Award for Excellence in Counterterrorism, Director of National Intelligence Personal Medallion and the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal. In sharp contrast, I was awarded a Blacklisting in 2009. Despite multiple attempts in past years to resolve this issue at the home office level and Agency offices, I have gone through a great ordeal since that has taken me 11 years to muster the energy to bring this matter to higher authority given the Agency’s repeated refusal to acknowledge wrongdoing. I therefore am making one final push before I consider forwarding this letter to national news and social media in the months that follow my notification to your office, upon clearance of course. I have not to my knowledge disclosed any classified information willingly. I am in sound mind and body--though disabled, but not mentally ill--in this testimony. I am of course deeply hurt by the events as they unfolded, but I have never sought vengeance to “Get Even” like some former employees have done in the past by joining up with a drug cartel, a terror organization, an adversary intelligence organization, nor threaten to expose classified material. Despite the incident, I was left decimated and bankrupt, not just financially, but spiritually, morally, physically, emotionally and mentally (PTSD and severe depression). Though humanity was ripped away from me, I always remained loyal.

I am not responsible should disclosure of this UNCLASSIFIED letter to Congressional officials make its way to open-source media, if others (3rd parties), familiar with the senior CIA official, the incident, individual related stories or to myself should discretely release such information. I am just concerned the CIA will try to intimidate or try to prosecute me to squash my testimony as a Whistleblower. I am hoping that as the reader reviews this letter that you will see that it is not/not filled will vague recollections and cloudy accusations like the testimonies the public witnessed during the Supreme Court Justice Kavanaugh’s hearings, nor Muslim U.S. Representative Ilhan Omar’s insensitive and senseless remark “Some people did something” in reference to 2,977 murdered victims of 9/11 at the hands of Islamic Muslim terrorists.

End State: I seek justice, not vengeance or threat to disclose classified information in open source. I want my self-respect restored and to get my life back together. I want to be made whole from concrete damages and losses of standard of living, properties and wellbeing resulting from CIA’s negligent actions in concert with IDEN-A:. I ultimately hope to achieve the following objectives as a result of this Whistleblower complaint:

Primary Objectives:

· I would like to request my nearly 4 years of service as an exclusive independent contractor in the combat zone for the CIA to be credited as service to the CIA and granted a full 20 year retirement pension. Otherwise I would like to ascertain what pension*(3) I am entitled to as promised when I resigned, due to discrimination as an Army Reservist, per the agreement I signed, but not entitled to because it was classified.

· To rebuke the hateful and erroneous accusation and call for an investigation into the actions taken by the CIA based on the “word” of a senior CIA official. The actions directed against me resulted in the total vile raping and destruction of my career, health and wellbeing that were unwarranted. This hateful and vile vendetta was unprofessional by a senior CIA officer who wielded his position, title and authority as a weapon to destroy. The senior CIA official should be reduced in pension and retirement rank, in my opinion.

· To have this unclassified letter/report of complaint confirmed and cleared for approval for release to open source news and social media at large by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). To have as much of my classified information and testimony declassified by the DNI for public awareness and distribution.

· To seek Whistleblower protection from prosecution for disclosing classified information that supports my truthful testimony to Congress cleared for Top Secret code word clearances. Protection from prosecution for having sought assistance by disclosing issues related to my case because I was forced to correspond to Congressional representatives via mail, email, telephone or in person interviews. Contractors and former employees should not live in fear of intimidation, retaliation or prosecution for seeking recourse.

· To change the behavior and accountability of senior officials of the CIA by seeking penalties amounting to 15% from the overall budget of the CIA for pompous actions embraced and embedded into Directorate of Operations and Counterterrorism Center. Corrective actions will only be taken seriously only if the Agency feels the pinch of having their annual budget reduced 15%.

· Reimbursement for Military Leave that was never honored by the CIA as required by federal law amounting to $11,000 plus, not including interest and an explanation why the CIA does not follow federal mandates under the Soldiers/Sailors Relief Act, following the CIA’s Office of General Counsel’s findings.

· Reimbursement of the $14,000 withheld, as a result of the retaliation by the senior CIA official with interest.

· Reimbursement for the 3 days of mission preparation and expenses provided to CIA, which I estimate to be $1,500-$2500, plus the coincidental disappearance of luggage--never recovered--with all my tax information valued at $2,500 nonrefundable fee not covered in claim.

· Since derogatory information has been placed throughout the CIA’s various database systems, I want to have this letter/report, associated documents, my testimonies, talking points and responses to be scanned and placed in official CIA cable traffic channels and Agency notes transcript system so future searches can yield all data on the matter to counter the derogatory information.

· To know why the CIA likely stole my luggage from the Washington Dulles International Airport**(4) the same day I was unknowingly Blacklisted. I was prepared to be deployed back into the Afghan Theater and had just completed a 3 day mission preparation. What are the odds my one piece of luggage would be stolen when I was told to go back home not knowing I was Blacklisted?

Secondary Objectives:

· Enhance Whistleblower Protection for employees of the Intelligence Community who are being Blacklisted. Employees and contractors should have a hearing and afforded an opportunity for legal representation during an investigation. No individual should be ambushed and simply Blacklisted. The purpose of Whistleblower Protection is to prevent retaliation from genuine reports of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse versus those claiming Whistleblower Protection because they have political ambitions or side with a particular Political Party affiliation. No statute of limitations should exist where an employee is violently raped of their career with no opportunity for recourse.

· Create public awareness and accountability by initially contacting members of Congress and elements of the U.S. Government primarily. Pursuant to timely approval, I wish to exercise my option to contact various news and social media outlets without intentionally (directly/indirectly) disclosing classified material for widespread exposure and public education, in order to reign in the CIA and Intelligence Community to the problems legitimate Whistleblowers face.

· To strip the former senior CIA official of his CIA Top Secret clearance and retirement awards. To prohibit IDEN-A: from being employed as an advisor or representative (directly or indirectly) to the CIA and Intelligence Community given his abuse of authority and likelihood of trying to exert influence through Agency connections.

· To call into question the reliability of CIA Human Intelligence collection efforts in Afghanistan during my tour that most likely continues to this day. Quantity, not Quality, was the norm. Jealousy, backstabbing, culturally naïve and inexperienced Case Officers with egos were subject to disinformation**(5) that undermined the credibility of intelligence collection efforts.

· To have CIA’s EEO, IG, and Ombudsman Office physically and completely relocated outside the Agency’s purview of control as these offices primarily serve as a “trigger” for protecting the Agency’s interests versus a “breaker switch” for employee civil rights*(6). Arbitration for all Intelligence Community personnel should be centralized under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. My attempts to correspond were ignored in 2009, 2010, 2012 and 2015*(7) because I was an outsider and treated as such just like when I tried to return from an Active Duty tour following 9/11.

- Perhaps an outside, but cleared Civilian Advisory Board*(8)--unlike the Presidential Advisory Board on Intelligence made up of big political campaign donors seeking a competitive advantage--can serve from a bottom-up approach to assess Intelligence Community handling of complaints and intelligence collection efforts like FISA to safeguard and reassure the American people their freedoms are indeed truly protected**(9).

Career and Historical Background: I served the U.S. Army (National Guard, Reserves and Active Duty) for 26 years. I also served 20 years for the CIA--16 years as a staff employee*(10) before being discriminated against for being in the Reserves and resigned to become an Independent Contractor for the CIA for 4 years**(11) that followed in the combat zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. See Attached resume. I resigned from the CIA after 16 years of service because of the continued discrimination I experienced at the CIA for being in the U.S. Army Reserves*(12). I had 7 bad retirement years in the Agency’s Military Reserves because of the Agency policies limiting retirement points one could earn. Even the Agency’s own Military Reserve unit was “hangdog” to agree that if you were not/not Delta Force, Navy S.E.A.L. or Special Forces that the CIA did not support members of the Reserves and National Guard. As a result, I switched to an outside unit which forced the CIA to comply with the Soldiers/Sailors Relief Act (S.S.R.A.) in honoring my obligation outside the CIA.

In late 2003 to early 2004, upon returning from a 2 year mobilization to Active Duty following 9/11, it took three months to get my foot back into the door. I had to reach out through a colleague to confront Human Resources to get the CIA to return a phone call. The CIA attempted to place me in menial downgraded position following my return. I refused to concede to this option in violation of the S.S.R.A. and landed a tour under the Director of Central Intelligence Office of Military Affairs (OMA). The CIA would eventually turn down my promotions because the CIA did not accept my evaluations from the Army and claimed my tour in OMA was not relevant. The CIA’s Office of General Counsel and Ombudsman Office later admitted (electronically) and concurred the CIA discriminated against me and members of the military reserves in 2005, when I resigned on principle because the Human Resource representative for the promotion panel asked “Why do you have rights as a Reservist?” Office of Equal Employment Opportunity was also made aware of the issue electronically as well. Subsequently, my office (OMA) asked me to become an Independent Contractor to be sent into the combat zones of Iraq and Afghanistan on their behalf*(13).

Iraq:

Setting the stage--Hostile Work Environment:

Key players: In June 2005, Station personnel included Chief of Station (COS) IDEN-D:, Deputy Chief of Station (D/COS) IDEN-A:, IDEN-B:, and Colonel IDEN-C:. Station had 3 secondary D/COS’ subordinate to IDEN-A: that included D/COS IDEN-E: (who made national headlines in 2010*(14), 2014 and 2015) and two others whom I did not know their names, nor roles. IDEN-B: was serving as station’s liaison**(15), while IDEN-C: was assigned to Station as Department of Defense military liaison from U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM). As the Agency representative of OMA I was originally intended to serve 1 year in Iraq to manage national level intelligence support*(16) to military theater units, but served only 3 months (June to September 2005) after enduring hostile work environment--harassment, bullying, badgering, intimidation and on the last day sexual harassment, as I was departing. I chose to leave on my own accord without consent of Station, but consent of Headquarters. As a result of being blamed for exposing politicization and later the reporting of the Child Pornography incident, I would later be falsely accused of overcharging the Agency $14,000 by D/COS IDEN-A:, who had collaborated with IDEN-B: and COL. IDEN-C: on the cable, but not always observed my late work hours.

· Before I submitted my voucher in official cable traffic, I had a meeting with Station’s Secretary, Chief of Finance, and Chief of Human Resources at the same time and all were in agreement I was in complete compliance with CIA policies, albeit I was submitting for 3 months of pay.

· Having served 6 years in Office of Security, in addition to having been involved in one case (circa 1997) and read many other reports that CIA disseminated for all to read of attempts to overcharge the CIA, I knew--using common sense--not to orchestrate such a stunt.

· The accusation was rubbish and I had told the OS investigator involved in the Child Pornography case that I anticipated retaliation, which the investigator acknowledged to occur.

· Again, I was never called upon to address said accusation against me via a hearing, nor were there any questions, investigations, charges or prosecution of said allegations in the four years that followed. I was tried in absenteeism behind closed doors in early to mid-2009, between--now promoted--COS IDEN-A: and my home office*(17) in the Counterterrorism Center.

COS IDEN-D:: I should have anticipated controversy for the new assignment when the COS IDEN-D: (who repeatedly captured the attention of national news in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020) clearly showed disdain toward the military during an OMA briefing in late 2004 to early 2005, pledging no commanding general was “going to tell him what to do as COS Iraq.”

· The COS would routinely refer to the 3rd Infantry Division Commander as a “Jackass” when I was fresh in country the first few weeks, behind Division Commander’s back of course.

· The COS when asked if he could meet with the Army National Guard Division Commander replied that the National Guard will need to furnish a Blackhawk helicopter to pick him up if the general wanted a meeting. “I am a SIS-4, not a GS-4. GS-4s get jerked around, SIS-4s do not!” I immediately coordinated with my team member assigned to the Army National Guard Division by phone and canceled that meeting as a result. I found COS’ egotistic attitude acidulous and condescending, given the fact the Army National Guard was experiencing as many casualties as the II MEF Marine Corps and 3rd Infantry Division. I made certain, however, the DCI’s Associate Director of Military Affairs met with the commanding general during his visit to Iraq.

COMMENT: COS had his own fleet of helicopters at his disposal that he could have used; as he apparently forgot there was a war on given the fact the CIA never left the safety and security of the “Green Zone” making it a challenge**(18).

IDEN-B: The first 3 weeks upon arrival to Station the work environment was well. Oddly, IDEN-B: even sought to confide in me that he had an apparent history with women being promoted above him. IDEN-B: acknowledged sheepishly to me to my surprise that he had been told by CIA’s Crimes and Narcotics Center that it was “best that he got out of their face for a couple of years”--in his own words. IDEN-B:’s resentment towards me began shortly after he asked how much I was paid for being an Independent Contractor (IC). IDEN-B: became visibly upset. I never flaunted what the CIA decided to pay ICs, I just simply answered his question. Nonetheless, IDEN-B: developed a grudge towards me that laid the foundation towards a hostile work environment and in part was able to influence if not paint a negative picture to D/COS IDEN-A:. IDEN-B:’s exhibited flash temperament on several occasions explained why CNC told IDEN-B: to take a hike.

· Once he got in an argument with a member of Delta Force over a writing pen that IDEN-B: thought the soldier stolen from him. As it turns out, the pen was in IDEN-B:’s book bag.

· On another occasion IDEN-B: apparently disagreed with a female analyst’s notes that had been disseminated to about 20 to 30 recipients. IDEN-B: said the analyst was stupid, but had forgotten he had cc: her on his response which touched off a flurry of unprofessional remarks between IDEN-B: and the female analyst that ended with D/COS IDEN-A: responding in bold red letters…….”CEASE FIRE….CEASE FIRE….CEASE FIRE!!!”

· IDEN-B: berated a female member of my team assigned to 3rd Infantry Division making her cry.

· IDEN-B: screamed at me late one evening in late August/early September 2005, in front of whom he thought was just another incoming member of my team whom I was briefing. As it turns out it was my OMA Branch Chief IDEN-G: who witnessed first-hand the hostile work environment.

COMMENT: I learned in April 2020, that IDEN-B: was terminated from the CIA for allegedly being a Whistleblower and was “Blacklisted.” His dismissal likely was for his hatred and hostile acts towards women being promoted over him*(19). IDEN-B: has Facebook, LinkedIn, YouTube, Twitter, and Spreaker-Cold War Radio to name just a few that cites his anger towards the CIA and “Deep State.”

COL. IDEN-C: IDEN-C: arrived at station a week after my arrival and expressed concern for being isolated by Station management. IDEN-C: also had a difficult time keeping her sidearm secured as it routinely fell out of her holster repeatedly at least 5 times in the first two weeks that followed until she just left the pistol in her room. It took the Colonel a few weeks to get the hang of Station and confided in me at one point she did not fit in. Unfortunately, the turn of events would lead to sexual harassment and an alliance being established with D/COS IDEN-A: and IDEN-B:.

· IDEN-C: who was much older than myself; was flirtatious with me to a point at the beginning, particularly after learning I had interracial relationships. However as tensions increased between myself and the two other Station officers, I observed IDEN-C: jumping to be on the winning side and her attitude totally changed towards me. This added more tension to an otherwise hostile work environment. I felt I was walking on egg shells and had no one to lodge my concerns, but to OMA, who was thousands of miles away.

· The IDEN-C: learned I was in the Army Reserves and would later try to use my Reserve status to exert influence over me which was a conflict of interest with CIA. I told her as much and that did not sit well with her.

· IDEN-C: sexually harassed me just before I was to take my seat aboard the helicopter bound for the airfield to leave Iraq after just 3 months. IDEN-C: grabbed me and pulled me tight against her breasts in an attempted hug that was unwanted, let alone unwelcomed given her role in the hostile work environment. I was thoroughly disgusted by the gesture and was offended she would try such a stunt to further intimidate or add to an otherwise hostile and now offensive work environment. It was one last jab below the belt because she was a woman and could get away with it. I pushed her away after the surprise unwanted hug that I found offensive.

D/COS IDEN-A:: Prior to my arrival at Station, D/COS IDEN-A: submitted in cable traffic to Headquarters what Station was doing to support the military effort that eventually would be used to brief Congressional personnel. When the Associate Director of Military Affairs (ADMA) and my Group Chief visited circa July 2005, I made a concerted effort for them to visit all 3 division headquarters and Special Operations Group in a 5 day period of time, in particular the U.S. Army National Guard Division Commander. The D/COS directed me to “Keep the ADMA out of Station’s hair!” The next five days of visit went smooth, but on the return flight back the Blackhawk helicopter experienced a mid-air engine failure that led to an inflight emergency hard landing. We were fortunate to be five minutes away from our base. Following the ADMA visit and return back to Headquarters, the ADMA reported to the DCI that the D/COS cable on Agency support to the Military was not as truthful as reported, implying it was a “product of politicization”*(20).

· I was only able to attend one meeting where I heard no derogatory feedback at the Special Forces briefing. However, I was not privy to the 3 other meetings with conventional forces (in particular the National Guard Commanding General) as I was arranging logistics for the follow-on visits.

· The D/COS IDEN-A: was visibly upset to hear the feedback from the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and demanded I write a cable stating that I heard no derogatory comments about CIA support to the military. I did as directed, but I could only address the one briefing I attended.

· D/COS IDEN-A: believed it was the OMA teams I managed that gave the ADMA his opinion. The ADMA also noted that the CIA never left the Green Zone as 3rd Infantry Division Commander did daily along “Route Irish” that was heavily targeted by insurgents**(21) using improvised explosive devices.

OMA Cell Team Leader: I found myself working daily, extremely long hours on a weekly basis. My teams provided 24/7 coverage for the military so I was forced to provide coverage between two shifts operating down range and answering to Headquarters OMA who was 8 hours behind in the time zone that prompted D/COS IDEN-A: to ask why I was working long hours. The unexpected problem I found routinely facing--6 weeks into the tour--was that most of the personnel being deployed by OMA had some level of military experience, but most had little to no experience working for the CIA. It was if OMA grabbed anyone off-the-streets with a pulse that could pass a stringent Top Secret clearance, Life Style Polygraph with full scope Special Background Investigation. I had members who did not know how to write cables, instant messaging, or use the Agency’s routine administrative notes system. A few had no knowledge of Agency resources or how to data-mine for information. Albeit the communications officers were staff or retired Agency personnel, I had to keep close tabs on most of the personnel. I had two individuals who never used a computer in their entire lives. I found I was not managing teams, but I had to hold them by the hand to teach (distance learning in most cases) how to operate Agency systems or answer questions by phone. OMA began sending me more replacements to visit me personally at Station to “right seat ride” for on the job training for a day or two before deploying them forward. OMA did not acknowledge their negligence to Station, but their lack of qualified personnel was straining relations between me as OMA representative and D/COS IDEN-A:, IDEN-B: and COL. IDEN-C:.

· D/COS IDEN-A: began exhibiting more contempt towards me which I felt was unwarranted and no doubt was being guided from IDEN-B:’s growing aggression towards me.

· D/COS IDEN-A: prohibited me from attending daily staff meetings with COS IDEN-D: as OMA Representative; reinforcing the hostile work environment that was not warranted.

· Station management’s lack of commitment to include OMA a seat at the daily COS briefing demonstrated station’s lack of support to conventional military forces and reinforced the persona if you are not Delta Force, Navy S.E.A.L. or US Special Forces then CIA had no interest. The OMA position had the appearance of just being a “False Flag Operation” for reporting purposes.

Child Pornography: The following incident was detailed in official Agency cable traffic; however I will highlight the gest of what happened. One night in mid to late August 2005, while D/COS IDEN-A: and IDEN-B: were on vacation I was notified by D/COS IDEN-A:’s second in command D/COS IDEN-E: that an alleged altercation between members of an OMA team had taken place located northwest of Baghdad--45 minutes by helicopter. D/COS IDEN-E: said “I am going to have that S.O.B thrown in prison!” Before I knew it, I was on the helicopter with Station’s Chief of Security IDEN-F: (whom I had known for 12 years) traversing through the combat zone at 1230 a.m. (local) to engage and disarm the staff employee who allegedly threw a curved shaped knife at a contractor during a heated exchange of words, when in fact he tossed it on a couch in the event they got into a physical altercation. While Chief of Security stood in the background I calmly disarmed the Agency employee who was compliant and directed him to collect his belongings as he was departing out on the next day’s flight. The contractor would be taking the following flight. At this time (approximately 130 a.m.) the employee tried to get the Chief of Security to read approximately 20 pages of notes about what had transpired and led up to the argument. Chief of Security declined and dismissed it. Once we returned to the airfield, the Chief of Security return to Station by helicopter, while I was directed to stay with the employee in a separate room, but to ensure he boarded the flight back to the U.S. That morning (approximately 5 a.m.) the employee gave me his notes to read and called OMA home office who disclosed by phone what was transpiring prior to the employee’s 9 a.m. departure from Iraq.

· I was surprised to learn I had been left out of the loop, let alone Station. The team member and Headquarters OMA had already reported to Office of Security that Child Pornography had been downloaded on 2 separate occasions onto 2 x CIA Top Secret Computers.

· The employee, who was a grandfather, took great offense as the Communications Officer to see such an infraction, let alone see what appeared to be Thailand children compromised in sexual positions onto the highly classified computers. The employee stated that it was possible for a Thailand consenting 18 year old to pass for a 10 year old so he was not sure of their ages. Nonetheless, the employee was angered by the apparent Child Pornography that resulted in an argument with the former CIA retired contractor whose wife is from Thailand. Classified computers are never connected to the open source internet.

· At approximately 3 a.m., the employee expressed to the Airfield Chief of Security his concern as to why he was being tossed out of country for doing the right thing of reporting Child Pornography. The Airfield Chief of Security was surprised by the remark and made an effort to make the employee’s flight back comfortable. The employee was asked if he would like to speak to a psychiatrist, to which the employee agreed. The Airfield Chief of Security apparently did not relay the revelation back to Station.

· Upon my return to Station 2 days after the launching of the rendition operation, I was congratulated by D/COS IDEN-E: for a job well done. The contractor who conducted the offense was on the same flight with me back to Station in preparations for his final trip home too. No doubt Chief of Security IDEN-F: had brief D/COS the day before, but nothing was said of the Child Pornography. IDEN-F: would later disclose to me in private that I did everything right, but I should not have given the staff employee his knife back. It was my judgement call and I stood by it.

· The contractor was permitted to leave Iraq graciously days later. In the meantime, I mistakenly thought OMA and the Airfield Chief of Security would have disclosed the incident with Station by then. A bad assumption on my behalf, but not worthy of retaliation.

· D/COS IDEN-E: directed me to write a cable back to Headquarters on the incident that IDEN-E: and IDEN-F: both had to coordinate and concur to disseminate. I do not recall if IDEN-D: was present at Station or was traveling, but I did as requested, reporting the events as they unfolded and exposed the truth of Station’s mistake that was not well received by IDEN-A: upon his return to Station*(22). Nonetheless, Office of Security was well aware of the incident by OMA.

· Unfortunately IDEN-D: and IDEN-A: were most likely not advised to the fact that IDEN-E: overreacted and failed to investigate the incident properly and IDEN-F: as Station Chief of Security was almost as equally at fault for ignoring the evidence being presented directly to him by the despondent staff employee prior to his expulsion, less than 7 hours later.

· Separate but in a related topic, Station’s Communication Officer would later turn to me and say…. ”In my conversations with [contractor’s name] whom I’ve known for over 20 years, I’ve not seen him act like this since the time he downloaded pornog!?!?………..Is that what’s this about?” I nodded my head to signify yes and he was stunned with astonishment, shook his head and slowly turned back to his computer. I disclosed this conversation with the Office of Security investigator upon my return to CIA**(23).

· I later learned from my OMA Group Chief that the staff employee I defended in cable traffic reportedly received a medal from the CIA Director for his actions in 2005, but the outcome of the case was unknown to me.

· Office of Security investigator was advised that I had made a copy of the cable I reported and placed it under my account in the Agency’s notes database should OS desire to compare the document to my official cable to see if it was tampered with.

COMMENT: I later learned from IDEN-B: in April 2020, that D/COS IDEN-A: was fuming with so much hatred towards me because Station looked as incompetent as the “Three Stooges.” It was this conversation that spurred me to try one last time to step forward, set the record straight and take corrective actions towards the CIA’s Blacklisting of my career.

End of Tour, Iraq: I was in no way disrespectful or unprofessional toward any parties at Station. I kept my personal observations and comments of Station to myself and shared only with OMA home office. Only once, near the end, did I walk into D/COS IDEN-A:’s office and express great displeasure for the hostile work environment being developed, encouraged and fostered by him, IDEN-B: and COL. IDEN-C: shortly before D/COS IDEN-A:’s vacation. His face flushed red with anger, but he had no response. After D/COS IDEN-A: and IDEN-B: departed on leave, and given the Child Pornography incident, I decided I too would depart back to Headquarters after I told OMA I had enough of the “B#LL Sh#t” with OMA not stepping up to the plate to reign in Station. Station was supposed to answer to Headquarters and I was tired of holding the “stink in a box” repeatedly. I returned back to Headquarters in Washington.

· OMA--to smooth things over--decided to reassign me to Kuwait to a Commanding General’s staff, but that deal did not come through fruition, so I was redirected to Afghanistan where I would take over the position as Deputy Chief of Base (D/COB) with the approval of “The Spider” himself IDEN-H:.

· I continued to endure acts of retribution--from D/COS IDEN-A:--by his acts to exert influence with OMA during my follow-on tour in Afghanistan.

· IDEN-A: would eventually become COS Afghanistan in 2008, and continue his reprisals.

COMMENT: I felt I could not engage D/COS IDEN-A: to advise how I felt, let alone explain OMA’s role in the screw ups. I just felt I was “left with holding the check.” I also knew that if I continued to stick around after the Child Pornography incident that I would be facing even more volatile hostilities and harassment from the “Three Amigos” (D/COS IDEN-A:, IDEN-B: and COL. IDEN-C:) and that this letter/report would become more of a novel for the reader to digest.

Afghanistan:

Tour of Duty--D/COB, 2005-2007: During my nearly 4 years in Afghanistan I served under four (4) Chief of Stations to include COS “The Spider” IDEN-H:, COS IDEN-I:, COS (unknown)--who only visited our base on his way out the door to check the block, and COS IDEN-A: who visited our base twice in 2008, after he discovered I was there for a 6 month tour. I worked with two Chiefs of Base (IDEN-J: and IDEN-K:) from 2005-2007 in the 17 months I served supporting Station and country wide operations, in addition to the military command and NATO representatives. I wore many hats at this assignment and can recall 14 major successes or contributions**(24) that stood out which assisted the CIA in its mission and benefitted the safety of U.S. military personnel, aside from the daily rituals. I had very good rapport with the military and I was the Station’s go to guy for whatever support was needed from the military, e.g. hospital support, fuel, logistics, aerial etc. The most difficult time I had at that base was dealing with the Silent Salute to 23 deceased soldiers that passed in review during my tour, in addition to the maimed Afghan soldier and child I had to console**(25) that actually placed the U.S. government in a positive light to tribal leaders in the region*(26). I would once again meet the ADMA who was this time accompanied by the Director of OMA (D/OMA)--a senior Clandestine Service officer like IDEN-A:--**(27) during this trip. I sensed the continued reinforced efforts by D/COS IDEN-A: to undermine and discredit me as part of his personal vendetta. I therefore briefed IDEN-J: on what happened in Iraq.

· The ADMA was very happy to see me, but the reception from the D/OMA was very cold. D/OMA never spoke to me in what seemed to be a 2 day visit to our base, despite having worked for him for over a year in the same office vault. I knew by the D/OMA’s actions that D/COS IDEN-A: had made derogatory remarks directly to him and that evidently the OMA Group Chief who worked for D/OMA had failed to address key concerns I had, let alone what transpired.

· D/OMA tried to influence the COB IDEN-J: to limit my time to 12 hours a day of work. COB IDEN-J: declined the suggestion, noting my position was critical to Station’s and other Bases’ operations and the co-location of the base with the military warranted as much as a 14 to 18 hour days depending on what transpired. Under COB IDEN-J:’s leadership, our base expanded from a team of 4 to a small group of 11 personnel. COB IDEN-J: told D/OMA that if his office was going to levy such a requirement that OMA should pull its support from the Station. D/OMA obviously pursued no further action, but I took his demeanor to be an extension of additional harassment and attempts by D/COS IDEN-A: to retaliate.

o This same D/OMA was in charge of the office when I resigned from CIA and provided no support to the way Military Reservists/National Guards were treated by the CIA.

o The D/OMA had even opposed a plan to bring Intelligence Community representatives together to discuss Intelligence Support to Civil Authorities after 9/11, because the concept bore a resemblance to Military Support to Civil Authorities.

· When the new COB IDEN-K: transitioned halfway through my tour, he alerted me to a cable that I should take action on, but I briefly scanned the first paragraph or page as I had my plate full and the cable would be overcome by events and forgotten. The cable I learned called into question my hours worked in Iraq that accused me of overcharging the CIA $14,000 and the cable was co-coordinated on by D/COS IDEN-A:, IDEN-B: and COL. IDEN-C: that I took once again as continued further acts of harassment and to facilitate an unwanted hostile work environment.

· Upon completion of the tour, there seemed to be a delay in my redeployment so I switched to the Counterterrorism Center (CTC)**(28) where faithfully I served for 2 ½ years.

COMMENT: I was once again subjected to harrowing experience of engine failure**(29) at the Kabul airfield that was surrounded by a minefield. Dangers lurked around all corners and I unwittingly had a prolonged exposure to Radioactive Hazard Material**(30) for nearly 3 hours that would affect me years later; the hazards of long term exposures to the Burn Pits, the periodic mortar and rocket attacks, and outgoing fire during the entire time in Afghanistan did not help either. I have been diagnosed with 25 ailments and disabilities, as of December 2020, in the service of my country, but this incident was a major contributor to 5 of them.

Tour of Duty--CTC Station, 2007: In 2007, CTC deployed me to Station in Afghanistan where I would work for COS IDEN-I: and carry out my CTC assignment and special duties**(31) for the three months that followed country wide. I would eventually be forward deployed down range where I spent the balance of my 2 ½ years along the Afghan/Pak border**(32). COS IDEN-I: was very supportive and satisfied with my performance during my short tour at Station and ultimately when I was forward deployed to the Base. Drawing on my Agency and military background and training, in addition to my Master of Science degree I had finally found my calling and had successfully executed multiple operations in 2 ½ years. I was always willing to take risks for the Agency and was one of the few personnel to remain behind to hold down the fort at Station when concern for major demonstrations was anticipated*(33).

· While assigned at station I was able to uncover a serious counterintelligence issue (CI)**(34) and theft**(35) by a prominent asset that senior members of Station’s Clandestine Service had failed to identify--who handled the subject with kid gloves**(36) for 2-3 years-- prior to my arrival. I used simple tradecraft**(37).

· My supervisor, IDEN-V:, advised me of the significance of what I had uncovered**(38).

· The senior Station official who recruited the asset showed in part poor operational tradecraft*(39) was rewarded with a promotion to COS in Europe following his tour in Afghanistan.

· I continued to manage multiple ongoing operations and facilitated/orchestrated 3 additional major operations**(40) and routinely handle huge sums of money for COS IDEN-I:**(41), while assigned at Station.

COMMENT: Although I experienced no further retaliations from D/COS IDEN-A: since his last attempt in late 2005 to early 2006, D/COS IDEN-A: likely thought he successfully had me sacked.

COMMENT: An issue that would later provide an historic teaching point of lessons learned on the pattern of jealous CO behaviors would unfold at my new post with Station. I was privy, first-hand, as Case Officers (COs) would get jealous of other COs who managed high profile cases. A former Delta Force soldier, now CO, who I worked with on joint projects**(42) would explain to me about efforts he encountered by jealous COs who tried to sabotage his efforts by discrediting his sources. The CO handled certain types of operations and resources**(43). He was perhaps the closest thing to “James Bond” I had seen in my entire CIA service.

Tour of Duty, Forward Deployment--2007-2009: In mid-2007, I was deployed initially by Headquarters along the Afghan/Pak border to appease the COB IDEN-L: who sought support from my home office in CTC. My home office felt it had a mission**(44), but believed my long term presence was not needed in abundance in the northeastern sector at that period of time. Therefore, it was determined that my time would be short at this base. However, after what seemed like two weeks of boots on the ground, an unfortunate Joint Operation**(45) involving Station and Base resources “flopped” and I was directed by COS IDEN-I: to take corrective actions**(46). I was predominantly successful, and it was my lead role that cemented my permanent residency at base for the 2 ½ years that followed, much to the chagrin of CTC home office. COB IDEN-M: transitioned in by late 2007, followed by COB IDEN-N: for a short tour in 2008, until the last COB (unknown) arrived in late 2008, for what seemed the last two months of my tour. Because I had been in country for so long, I knew the culture and tribal customs well and I even began to comprehend the Pashto language through osmosis. The local Afghan Intelligence Chief even noted how tribal elders were complaining I had been in country too long and made it difficult for them to deceive our base during meeting engagements. COBs IDEN-L:, IDEN-M: and IDEN-N: often times sought my input as to how to address certain cultural flare ups with local tribes even on our base**(47), particularly operations involving our Afghan forces**(48). As a result, I would take lead in these engagements and continue to have successes in the field. I had my setbacks too as I always had something to learn from Afghanis*(49).

· I had cleaned up a disaster from a previous Joint Operation and prevented two more disasters**(50) in relation to the same mission 2 years later. My operations had also saved U.S. soldiers’ lives by setting back enemy operations**(51) for 1 ½ years. I successfully began driving a wedge between the local villagers from supporting Taliban and Al Qaida forces making it difficult for them to conduct operations in a 3 provincial wide area, to include disrupting supply and recruiting efforts**(52). Another project was able to identify**(53) a person of interest and exposed one of base’s sources--held in high regard by a CO--for intentionally trying to misdirect base from person of interest.

· I had coordinated an attack, based on a tip from a source against insurgents that effectively displaced their presence and helped to create--along with applying other successful military operations--misgivings between local villagers, Taliban and the AQ forces that were now beginning to stream into our area of operation.

· I was unable to document 4**(54) operations that took place during my time, due to overshadowing events, but COB IDEN-L:, COB IDEN-M: and COS IDEN-I: were each briefed, in addition to CTC who wanted it in official traffic that never occurred as I had hoped. Three of the four operations had significant impacts.

· I continued to draw on Station resources I managed**(55) and leveraged them for my use at base for success.

COS IDEN-A:: In 2008, COS IDEN-A: had settled in at Station and began touring the bases where he discovered my whereabouts, which prompted me to independently briefed both COBs (IDEN-M: and IDEN-N:) in retrospect on what transpired in Iraq and that COS IDEN-A: would try to retaliate for their situation awareness. Upon COB IDEN-M:’s departure there was a period of elapsed time before COB IDEN-N: would arrive for her short tour. COB IDEN-M: nominated me to take over as Acting COB because I had previously been D/COB for 17 months and the fact I had been in country at that time for 3 years. Furthermore, I was by this time well versed on the culture, in addition to Station and Base operations. According to COB IDEN-M:, COS IDEN-A: immediately shot the idea down.

· Atmospherics at the base began to take a turn for the worst near my end of tour as new COs who rotated in under COS IDEN-A:’s watch--that I would normally have good rapport with in the past--suddenly exhibited outward consternation of my efforts and went out of their way to leave me out of staff meetings--CO IDEN-O: in particular. IDEN-O: was jealous that SOCOM specifically sought out my input and participation in briefings--not the COs’--for visiting SOCOM and conventional force commanders’ senior leadership briefings.

COMMENT: I found myself taking on additional duties involving base interpreters whom I had trained and helped to enhance their performance and usefulness*(56). I was also able to ascertain why certain Afghan**(57) elements on our base were not executing half their mission critical functions to the fullest and briefed COS IDEN-A: in late 2008, who made note of the problem**(58) as it was only he that could take action on. However, his facial expression was aloof.

Case Officers: I have known many good, seasoned COs in Iraq and Afghanistan**(59), but I found most sent to the field were inexperienced in the Agency and most COs were envious as they felt they should be carrying out more operations**(60) than just collecting intelligence. Shortly after the new batch of COs in late 2008, I found myself, however, losing sources apparently due to deliberate acts of sabotage. My last two months of tour suddenly ended with assets and operations being discredited, terminated, undermined and no longer viable. Never in the 2 ½ years did Headquarters, Station, nor base COs ever approach me to advise me that my resources had questionable issues. After so much success with operations using tradecraft**(61), what were the odds of having so much failure at the end of tour? The incident reminded me of the teaching points the former Delta Force, now CO, had expressed to me.

· The reliability of CIA Human Intelligence collection efforts in Afghanistan were indeed undermined by young COs who were culturally naïve and inexperienced. COs with inflated egos thinking they were the next Sean Connery—007 were constantly being tested by assets and subject to disinformation that undermined the credibility of intelligence collection efforts. Quantity, not Quality, was the norm as usual. Not surprising then that base had to reduce the number of assets “to separate the wheat from the chaff,” particularly after COS IDEN-A: reduced base COs by 50%**(62).

· In 2007, CO IDEN-P:, who had risen up from the ranks to be a CO, had discovered a pattern that was being directed at base COs who were unaware of the intent to mislead or discredit base resources**(63). Base had lost a few resources due in part to this cunningness.

COMMENT: Afghanis use to practice crossing tribal boundaries under the cover of darkness to surreptitiously slip into adversarial compounds and see how many throats could be slashed, while the victims slept and then escape unnoticed. Hence, cunningness, paranoia, lying, cheating, and stealing were second nature to Afghanis for survival and a challenge in the debriefing rooms**(64).

Addressing COS IDEN-A:’s False Accusation: Simply put, I deny COS IDEN-A:’s accusation of overcharging the CIA $14,000. My historical documented pattern of work reflects my true nature. Actions speak louder than words and you should consider the source of the information, but I was very honest in my dealings with the CIA when it came to money over the 20 years and the multiple Lifestyle Polygraphs. I was simply the victim of a personal vendetta of retaliation and CIA’s knee jerk reaction to Blacklist me solely on the senior Agency official’s word without questioning me, let alone not investigating the allegation. I would gladly have continued my assignments in Afghanistan and I even offered take over operations on the Pakistan side of the border, performing the same task, but to no avail. Nonetheless, I was honest, responsible, and did not lavishly spend taxpayer money.

· In OMA I always kept my government expenses low for mission related expenses prior to resigning.

· I was known for actually working 12 to 16 or more long hours in Office of Security, DCI’s Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, Near East South Asian Analysis (NESA), Non Proliferation Center (NPC), Counterterrorism Center, and Office of Military Affairs. It was only in OS where I was actually paid overtime. As a contractor I only charged for hours worked. There was not one person on base that could not say I was not busy 14-18 hours a day.

· Station Finance in 2008, remarked that they wished all my counterparts followed my example with funds being spent. I ran operations a fourth of what it cost**(65) other bases.

· As noted, I had been previously entrusted by COS IDEN-I: in 2007, to handle huge sums of money**(66) without signing for it to the best of memory. I could have easily skimmed it off the top as Afghan tradition calls for and no one would have been wiser, but my conscience.

· I stayed at low budget hotels like Wolf Trap in Vienna, Virginia for $60 a night versus the lavish Sheraton Hotel in Tyson Corner, Virginia at $250 a night--except when CTC home office finally demanded upon my return in January 2009, and final mission prep in early June 2009 that I stay at the Sheraton.

· Knowing the Afghan culture so well, as a general rule when dispensing taxpayer funds I used the Afghan Face, Afghan Price*(67) as a way of controlling costs. It was not surprising to see my base alone spend 3 times or greater on projects**(68) or expenses**(69) at New York City prices to an Afghan contractor who would have taken significantly less if dealing with the Afghan government or locals.

COMMENT: Recently it was reported, as much as $19 billion USD was lost to waste, fraud and abuse by Afghanis. Even more appalling is that U.S. soldiers died because Afghan contractors paid protection money*(70) to the Taliban and AQ to fulfill projects beyond U.S. military sphere of protection, let alone the U.S. Army’s responsibility for funding, oversight and project management.

Retaliation and Blacklisting by COS IDEN-A: and CIA’s CTC Role: After serving nearly 4 years between Afghanistan and a few short months in Iraq, starting with a 3 month tour that stretched to typically 4 and 5 months and finally a 6 month tour at the end; a much needed 4 month break was in order with my return in late January 2009. I had a tandem replacement--IDEN-Q:*(71)--the last year who I had previously discussed the extended break with in June 2008. My intent was to return back to the field for CIA in June 2009. I had been in communications with CTC home office’s IDEN-S: from February to March 2009, and coordinated an update to my passport with IDEN-T: as it would expire in July 2009. Incidentally, part of the reason for such an extended R&R was because I needed to complete my U.S. Army Reserve obligation prior to redeployment. I therefore finalized and coordinated my plans with my primary point of contact in CTC home office, IDEN-R: in May 2009. The plan was for me to report the first week of June 2009, for a week of mission preparations prior to deployment. I was also advised that I may be redirected to another location by IDEN-R:, who would tell me once I reported to the office that the mission and operations I provided were pretty much dismantled**(72) at the old base. Strangely enough, my mission preparation was reduced from one week to just 3 days and I was advised the office was not prepared, after all, to deploy me just yet. Thinking nothing of it, I decided to go to lunch where I saw IDEN-A: in the Agency cafeteria and had a gut wrenching feeling retaliation was coming to a head. My instinct was distinctly and exceedingly overwhelming. I told myself I was perhaps overthinking the situation and moved on.

I decided to pay a visit to the CTC contracting office to submit my pay voucher and travel expenses for the 3 days (I was never reimbursed) and was advised that CTC had an assignment in the developing stage**(73) in early 2010, that was a good fit for me in Pakistan that drew upon a particular operational skills from my previous experience as D/COB in Afghanistan. I accepted the offer; however that too would fail to materialize. As I began to depart the CTC contracting office my passport*(74) was secured and as I departed Headquarters my Contractor’s badge was also acquired by security personnel, as well. I thought to myself this was unusual, based on the particular facial expression of the Security Protective Officer who I had known for over 15 years. I passed the incident off figuring it was just a security policy as a similar situation occurred during my 2 year Army Reserve mobilization following 9/11, when I happen to be conducting business at the CIA. However, my badge back then had been secured well over a year after being on Active Duty.

I departed Washington-Dulles International Airport **(75) for my return home only to find my luggage that was intended for use in Afghanistan had mysteriously disappeared on the same day I was unknowingly Blacklisted. Anyone else who may have taken my luggage accidently could easily have seen my name and address inside and outside the baggage and simply returned it. I filed a claim on 12 June 2009, that covered the basics, but my 3 years of tax receipts intended for Tax Masters whom I had paid in advance $2,500 was not refundable. I was partially refunded the loss of gear, clothing, personal affects and movies I had packed. The result of the theft left me being sued by the IRS*(76) in 2014, as my accountant could not complete or file my tax returns during my period in the combat zone as that information was stored inside the luggage. As a precaution, I purchased a Life Lock policy for protection against identity theft, but no attempts to exploit my treasure trove of personal information never took place in the years that followed to date. I have good reason to speculate [Sources and Methods] the Counterterrorism home office, IDEN-D: or IDEN-A: orchestrated the luggage disappearance perhaps to troll for any information or content that was sensitive to the Agency program I supported or just plain vindictiveness. As of 3 November 2020, I am still haunted by the IRS*(77) 11 years later with tax liens because of this peculiar coincidental theft.

After my persistence to inquire as to the reason for the delay, a week had past and I was eventually notified by IDEN-R: (based on his conversation with IDEN-U:) that IDEN-A: would not concur on my redeployment because IDEN-A: had an issue with me in Iraq in 2005, when IDEN-A: was D/COS. IDEN-R: who was apparently puzzled and said “It was a surprise to me since you have been working on our (CTC) program for quite a while. If you want we can meet when you come to HQs.” IDEN-R: then called me to explain that IDEN-A: claimed I tried to overcharge the CIA $14,000 which I quickly denounced the accusation and explained what really took place in 2005, and told IDEN-R: that I was blatantly being retaliated against. IDEN-R: abruptly suggested then that I lay low for a few months to wait for IDEN-A: to depart country as COS and that the office would see about bringing me back onboard again. I diplomatically decided to give the suggestion a try for a few months, but IDEN-R:’s promise never transpired. I had been deliberately misled by the CTC home office on the promises of redeployment that was just nothing, but a field of dreams that faded.

COMMENT: I could no more return to Headquarters as a Blacklisted contractor, than I could return as a Staff employee after returning from a 2 year mobilization on Active Duty. My badge was confiscated and CTC was not likely to renew it. I would not be allowed past the front entrance. I was an outsider.

As July 2009, passed along the feeling of being Blacklisted grew stronger as attempts to contact IDEN-R: yielded negative results. I strongly believe--based on previous conversations with IDEN-R:--that CTC home office had clearly been heavily influenced, but not by IDEN-A:’s decision to not concur for my redeployment alone. I am surmising that IDEN-A: leveraged his relationship from Iraq 2005, with IDEN-D: who was now the Director of CTC (D/CTC) in 2009. IDEN-D: no doubt remembered the humiliating Child Pornography debacle in 2005, under his leadership, but was not privy to the full disclosure of the actual events and roles by IDEN-E: and IDEN-F: that took place. Therefore, I believe because of IDEN-D:’s position as D/CTC, he was key to ultimately discouraging my CTC home office from having a close and continuous relationship with me--based on the false narrative pushed by IDEN-A:. Again, I emphasize that was never investigated, charged, nor prosecuted by the CIA for such an egregious act of fraud.

COMMENT: The “IDEN List” provided separately from this report gives insightful open source articles on IDEN-D:, in addition to IDEN-E:’s additional career malfunctions in 2010 and 2014.

COMMENT: In May 2020, I was utilizing LinkedIn to search for and engage IDEN-B: for the first time in 15 years online after discovering he was in a legal battle with CIA for being Blacklisted as a Whistleblower. I found it ironic and left my comment about his character and why he was likely Blacklisted. IDEN-B:’s response reflected his typical abusive behavior tossing out random attacks and revealed that “You pissed off IDEN-A: and he was as high as you could go to piss off.”--in reference to Iraq, 2005. This would reinforce my assertion that IDEN-A:’s motive to continue his persecution of me over the 4 year span is valid.

I continued to try and seek employment during the recession, and contacted the CIA’s Process Review Board, but the companies only wanted to send me back to the CIA where I had been Blacklisted. When a suicide bomber struck the CIA base at FOB Chapman in Khost, Afghanistan in December 2009, that killed seven (7) CIA employees and wounded six (6) others, I tried to contact IDEN-R: to try and volunteer to assist in being a replacement, but was once again I was met with silence. So between the Blacklisting and the economic recession I lost everything I worked for in 30 years*(78) in a matter of 1 year after returning home in January 2009. To dispute the incident would have taken more than a year that I did not have to avoid losing my life’s work. Unfortunately, severe depression set in as I became homeless for the next five (5) years, despite having a top notch security clearance. Companies that wanted to hire me to go back to the CIA would learn I was Blacklisted and therefore, no longer a viable candidate.

Conclusion: It has been over 15 years since I was falsely accused of IDEN-A:’s ruse to cover up a prolonged and bitter campaign targeting me for the sake of vengeance. I had faithfully served this country devoting 20 years of total service for the CIA. I had sacrificed family face time and had even placed my life on the line for this country. During my Agency tenure, I had broken through the Plexiglas ceiling from the bottom ranks and stigma of support roles as a Security Protective Officer and Intelligence Assistance into the analytical and operational ranks**(79). For the war effort I did my best to protect American soldier lives if I could and I did. I gave “Outstanding Service and Loyalty to Country,” but what I got in return was not warranted. I have since and continue to this day to crawl out from under the rubble.

I therefore ask that the CIA be held accountable for allowing this widespread internal business culture of retaliation and civil rights abuse. I also ask that the senior CIA official IDEN-A: who I believe is retired and working with Constellis Holdings Inc.--a non-tax paying entity for U.S. tax purposes that has its headquarters in Reston, Virginia--to be held accountable and for CIA and the Intelligence Community to discontinue any and all relationships with IDEN-A: to include any position he may have over a project or as an advisor (directly or indirectly). I also ask that IDEN-A:’s clearances be immediately suspended and revoked as part of his punishment. It pains me to know IDEN-A: will be doing a victory lap, once he is privy to this document; but ultimately I want closure, justice, accountability and I want to be made whole again. I want to force the record to be set straight and embedded in CIA databases. After all, it was not drugs or alcohol addiction, nor theft that destroyed my life and career. It was an abuse of authority by a senior CIA official (IDEN-A:) and no opportunity to offer a defense. I have honored my commitment to this country as a Veteran, an employee, and as a contractor with Loyalty, Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, Personal Courage, Accountability and Responsibility for 3 decades. I expect nothing less from leaders, but to lead by example.

Lastly, there are some things in life worse than dying and I would have rather died on the battlefield with honor than have died on the streets for those five years that followed as a result of being dishonestly, surreptitiously and cowardly Blacklisted than to confront me face to face. Unlike SSG Travis W. Nixon and Chief Petty Officer First Class Joshua T. Harris who died with honor in Afghanistan*(80) (see attachments), I know in my heart I will never be made whole or given back my honor. Nor upon my death will I have a bugle playing Taps, a folded American Flag previously draped across my casket to be given to a loved one, nor solemn words read over my grave to bring closure to a life that served his country. It’s not how I will be buried--in a pauper’s grave; it’s how I will be remembered that counts. However, my nearly 30 years of collective service should never have an epitaph that reads…

I testify that the information provided in this report, support documentation and attachments to be complete, correct and to the best of my knowledge and belief a truthful testimony. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss 1001, I knowingly and willfully understand making a false statement or concealing a material fact in any manner is a criminal offense punishable by a fine and or imprisonment.

X:____________________________ Date:_________________________